

# Assessing Alternative Options for a More Sustainability-focused CAP

Évaluation d'options alternatives pour une Politique Agricole commune plus axée sur la durabilité

Bewertung alternativer Optionen für eine stärker auf Nachhaltigkeit ausgerichtete GAP

Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, Nicolas Lampkin, Christine Krämer, Frank Offerman and Norbert Röder

## Aligning the CAP with public welfare objectives

The papers in this Special Issue of *EuroChoices* address a wide range of options for aligning the CAP more closely with public welfare and sustainability objectives. Three of the papers contain reports on experiences with innovative schemes currently implemented, i.e. results-based agri-environmental schemes in Ireland, England, Flanders (Prager *et al.*, this issue) and Switzerland (Gilgin *et al.*, this issue), and eco-schemes in the Netherlands (Jongeneel *et al.*, this issue). Three further papers present concepts for a fundamental reorientation of the CAP basic payments (Latacz-Lohmann *et al.*, Lampkin and Sanders, and Krämer and Röder, this issue). Common to all papers is the idea of rewarding farmers for the provision of public goods in a more targeted manner. The implementation of these concepts would underpin the CAP with an environmental performance paradigm, transforming farmers from subsidy recipients to service providers.

## The pros and cons of alternative policy design features

The different policy options presented have a range of characteristics that are relevant to consider when making choices about

payment systems that reward environmental sustainability outcomes more directly. We have categorised the policy design features into the seven different types discussed below. [Table 1](#) provides a summary of these features and how they relate to the different options presented.

“ Est ce que justifiable de distribuer une grande partie du budget de la PAC sans retour significatif pour le climat et l'environnement ? ”

When designing innovative policies there are many requirements, which cannot all be met simultaneously. Policies should harness farmers' self interest in enhancing their farm environmental performance. They must also be simple, with straightforward data, documentation and monitoring requirements to reduce farmers' administrative burden. Policies should also easily integrate with or substitute for existing agri-environmental measures. And finally, they should be compatible with proposals for the next CAP reform. Here we explain each of the design

features and consider some pros and cons relating to each of them.

## À la carte, menu or indicator approach

Farmers can select measures to implement on the following bases:

- À la carte: individual measures for individual land parcels as desired.
- Menu: A bundle of different measures must be implemented simultaneously. This may require the complete implementation of a given bundle of measures (e.g. no use of mineral fertilisers or pesticides – the decision is then whether to participate or not), or a bundle of measures may be defined from which a certain number of measures are selected (e.g. in the Dutch eco-scheme).
- Indicator-based assessment: Individual parcels or the whole farm are assessed using indicator metrics (as in Rewarding Environmental Outcomes approach (Lampkin and Sanders, this issue). All indicators integrated into the model are assessed, some of which may be similar to the à la carte approach (e.g. pesticide exclusion).

**Benefits and drawbacks:** The à la carte approach gives farmers maximum freedom in choosing which measures to implement on which land parcels. This could reduce the additionality of the policy

**Table 1: Overview of design features of the policy models presented in the Special Issue**

	Existing schemes (2023–2027)				New policy concepts for CAP reorientation		
	Eco-Scheme Netherlands (Jongeneel <i>et al.</i> )	Incentive for developing and managing species-rich grassland Flanders (Prager <i>et al.</i> )	Agri Climate Rural Environment Scheme (ACRES) Ireland (Prager <i>et al.</i> )	Results-based Agri-environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) England (Prager <i>et al.</i> )	Performance-based Farm Payment (Latacz-Lohmann <i>et al.</i> )	Rewarding Farm-level Environmental Outcomes (Lampkin <i>et al.</i> )	Public Goods Bonus (Krämer <i>et al.</i> )
<b>Policy design features</b>							
À-la-carte, menu or indicator approach	Menu	Menu	Both approaches included <sup>d</sup>	Initially no requirements, then baseline menu	À-la-carte	Whole farm indicator-based assessment	À-la-carte
Results-based, action-based or hybrid payments	Results-based	Hybrid	Results-based	Initially purely results-based, then hybrid	Results-based	Results-based (mixed indicators)	Results-based
Points model	Yes	No	No	Yes (habitat scores)	Yes <sup>b</sup>	No	Yes
Threshold values or levels	Yes	No	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Number of threshold levels	3	/	1	5 payment tiers	2	4	/
Bonus for multiple measures/ indicators delivered	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Regional differentiation of payments	Yes	No	No	No	Possible <sup>d</sup>	Possible <sup>d</sup>	Possible <sup>d</sup>
Integration of organic farming or other certification systems	Yes (Gold level)	No	No	No	Implicitly <sup>e</sup>	Implicitly <sup>e</sup>	Implicitly <sup>e</sup>
Number of measures on offer/Number of indicators	22	3 minimum requirements, otherwise farmers choose as they see fit	11 (8, including 3 with variants)	Initially, farmers choose as they see fit, then some baseline requirements	23	14	19, expanded by 10 measures as part of a research project 2025
Essential characteristics	Complex value of measures through stages, regionalisation and addressing of multiple environmental areas	Combination of action-based payment for minimum requirements and results-based payment based on botanical value	Farmers must either select a farm-level measure (à la carte) or at least two measures relating to individual plots	Combination of action-based payment for baseline requirements and results-based payment based on habitat scores of plots	Hectares enrolled in the scheme are weighted with a factor indicating their contribution to each of the Farm to Fork Strategy goals	Focus on results orientation, indicator values mostly calculated on the basis of IACS data	Point models initially developed as eco-scheme

Notes: <sup>a</sup>Either one measure covering the entire farm (à la carte) or at least two measures relating to individual areas (menu) must be selected.

<sup>b</sup>Model includes conditionality, eco-schemes and AECS.

<sup>c</sup>If individual area-related measures are implemented, at least two must be selected.

<sup>d</sup>Could be integrated or is under development.

<sup>e</sup>Organic farming implicitly included through choice of appropriate measures.

as farmers may be tempted to select measures that are most easy to implement or that they are already practicing. A menu-based approach, by contrast, would force farmers to

implement all measures on the menu, including the more demanding ones. The indicator approach is the most entrepreneurial option: it allows farmers to freely

choose the management practices they consider best suited to achieve a good indicator value. A given environmental goal may thus be achieved at least cost.

## Results-based, action-based or hybrid payments

Remuneration for environmental services rendered may be either purely results-based, purely action-based or a combination of both (hybrid). We classify the Dutch eco-schemes (Jongeneel *et al.*, in this issue), the Public Goods Bonus (Krämer and Röder, in this issue) and the Performance-based Farm Payment (Latacz-Lohmann *et al.*, in this issue) as results-based systems, as farmers choose measures from a list which are rated in terms of their ecological effect and subsequently remunerated based on the rating. In action-based systems, the compliance with specific management requirements is remunerated based on the estimated compliance costs. Hybrid systems combine action and results-based payments.


**Benefits and drawbacks.** Instead of rewarding farmers for prescribed management practices, results-based payments pay farmers for the delivery of environmental public goods, either per parcel or per farm. Farmers decide their own management practices to achieve the desired outcome(s). This approach motivates and increases 'buy-in' from farmers as many prefer performance-related financial incentives (Prager *et al.*, this issue). A key prerequisite for this approach is that the results can be measured with sufficient accuracy and at reasonable cost. Also, the 'production function' converting environmental practices (land use changes) into environmental outcomes must be sufficiently robust and, ideally, not subject to factors beyond the farmers' control. As the latter condition is hardly ever met in reality, results-based payments involve the risk of low payments for farmers and add unpredictability for administering agencies.

There are two ways for policy designers to alleviate the risk of low payments in results-based schemes. The first is the adoption of a hybrid approach combining the result orientation with supporting action-based payments. While the results-based component provides farmers with a continuing incentive to

maintain good environmental performance across their holding, the action-based payment reimburses farmers for part of the costs of specific management practices. It thus serves to mitigate the risk of low payment if the targeted environmental outcomes do not materialise. For example, the Results-Based Agri-environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) in England started off as a 'pure' results-based contract but, after consultation with the participating farmers, later became hybrid to incorporate a baseline action-based payment (Prager *et al.*, in this issue).

The second approach is to base payments on modelled results or suitable proxies that are closely correlated with the targeted environmental outcome (Bartkowski *et al.*, 2021). This approach is

pursued by the Public Goods Bonus (Krämer and Röder, this issue), which assigns scores/points to each of the environmental practices on the list, ideally according to their environment-enhancing potential. Likewise, the Performance-based Farm Payment (Latacz-Lohmann *et al.*, this issue) uses fixed factors indicating the contribution of the management practices to each of the Farm-to-Fork Strategy goals. Compared to pure results-based payments, systems based on modelled results maintain a strong incentive to 'do better to get more' while minimising the risk of low payments for farmers due to factors beyond their control. At the same time, they can reduce the transactions costs, especially when environmental outcomes are difficult and costly to observe, measure and verify.



**A multifunctional landscape combines agricultural production with recreational opportunities and creates habitats for wildlife © Claudia Dodenhoff.**

## Points- or cost-based approaches

Some models base payment rates on the traditional additional costs and income foregone approach to implementing measures. This can allow payments to be based on defensible calculations, but does not reflect the quantity or value of environmental outcomes delivered. Valuing the environmental outcomes directly can also be difficult in the absence of market mechanisms. An alternative is to award points to each measure based on its ecological value (e.g. Public Goods Bonus) or using a factor indicating its contribution to goal achievement (e.g. Performance-based Farm Payment or the Dutch Eco-scheme). Farmers receive points for implementing measures, which are then converted into a payment in a second step. In the Dutch case, points are accumulated to reach Bronze, Silver or Gold levels, for which payments are made.

**Benefits and drawbacks.** Points allocated to specific measures can be set to reflect environmental priorities and thus demand. Regional priorities would also influence the weightings given to individual measures, indicators or indicator combinations. In less-favoured areas where agriculture is a marginal business and land

abandonment is a problem, a measure like fallow could be assigned zero points. By contrast, the same measure could be awarded the maximum number of points in an intensive arable farming region where structural elements are missing in the landscape.

Besides having a motivational effect on farmers, point systems are particularly well suited for communicating the societal benefits achieved. As an overarching indicator of ecological value, they can also serve as an environmental benchmarking tool for farms, as called for in the strategic dialogue at EU level and now being developed as the Farm Sustainability Compass by the European Commission. Point models assess environmental measures from the benefit (rather than the cost) side. This may under certain circumstances lead to a mismatch of payments for, and costs of, service provision. This may be the case, for example, when farmers implement highly-rated measures at low costs. In such situations, they may gain large windfall profits. A cost-based payment would enhance budgetary cost-effectiveness.

Point systems may be subject to criticism regarding the point value assigned to individual measures. It is particularly difficult to derive

consistent point values for measures targeting biodiversity enhancement as the benefits depend heavily on regional conditions and goals.

## Threshold values/levels or continuous scaling

In policy models with thresholds, certain minimum areas or a minimum number of points at farm level or per hectare must be achieved in order to trigger a payment. For example, in the Performance-based Farm Payment (Latacz-Lohmann *et al.*, this issue), farmers must achieve at least one Farm-to-Fork Strategy goal to qualify for payment, or minimum scores on the indicator assessment for Rewarding Environmental Outcomes (Lampkin and Sanders, this issue) can be defined.

### **Benefits and drawbacks.**

Thresholds that must be achieved to qualify for payment serve as both stick and carrot. They encourage farmers to provide a minimum level of environmental services; at the same time, they provide an entrepreneurial incentive to achieve the next threshold level. In the best-case scenario, they cause farmers to find themselves competing for the highest threshold level, thereby shifting attitudes towards the



**Oilseed rape cultivation turns the countryside yellow in May – a major tourist attraction in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany © Claudia Dodenhoff.**

environment and, perhaps, in the long run, social norms. Thresholds also have the potential to streamline the decision-making process for farmers, by reducing the number of available options. However, farmers who cannot reach the next higher threshold have no incentive to provide partial services, and farmers who have reached the highest threshold level lack incentives to provide further services.

Threshold levels, and thus the level of ambition, can be set based on a benchmarking approach, e.g. by the proportion of businesses that achieve the threshold in the status quo (e.g. the top 25 per cent of farms). These advantages are offset by potential disadvantages as remuneration is not strictly proportional to the extent of the provision of public goods. Depending on the distance between the thresholds, this can lead to the situation that farms with markedly different performance levels receive the same payments.

As an alternative to thresholds, a continuous scaling approach (e.g. a 100-point scale) could allow actual outcomes to be better reflected, but with challenges for payment setting and administration. In particular, greater precision in outcome measurement is required, alongside increased decision-making complexity and reduced incentive effects to reach the next threshold.

### Rewarding diversity or permanence of measures with a bonus

A bonus payment may be granted for implementing a minimum number of different measures or scoring highly on multiple indicators, or for maintaining measures for longer periods in the expectation of increased environmental gain. The idea behind such a bonus is to reap the environmental synergies that arise from the diversity of measures in the agricultural landscape.

**Benefits and drawbacks.** In the Public Goods Bonus, farmers receive a 10 per cent bonus on the sum of their points when they

implement at least four measures with a specified surface area on their land. This bonus provides farmers with an additional incentive to implement a wide variety of measures – with benefits for biodiversity at landscape scale. A bonus system can also be used for threshold-based systems, for example if thresholds are achieved on multiple indicators.

“ Ist es gerechtfertigt, einen Großteil des GAP-Haushalts ohne nennenswerten Nutzen für Klima und Umwelt auszugeben? ”

However, granting a bonus is not without its challenges. Its definition leaves considerable scope for arbitrariness. Ideally, the size of the bonus is aligned with the additional benefits for the environment. From the authority's perspective, a diversity bonus could encourage innovation and engagement; however, it could also make the uptake of measures, and thus the budget planning, less predictable.

### Policy targeting through payment differentiation

The payment rates or points may vary according to farm type or location, reflecting relevant policy priorities (e.g. Public Goods Bonus). Various spatial criteria can be used for this purpose, such as soil quality, opportunity costs or location in protected areas. In addition to varying the payment rate or the point value of a measure, differentiation can also be achieved by differentiating the requirements for measures.

**Benefits and drawbacks.** Payment differentiation can be approached from the benefit or the cost side. From the benefit side, it serves to 'steer' policies in the right regions where they

promise maximum environmental benefits. From the cost side, payment differentiation would account for regional (or farm-type specific) differences in implementation costs. This serves the dual purpose of avoiding overcompensation of low-cost farmers on the one hand, and creating sufficient incentive for high-cost farmers to participate on the other. Overall, more environmental gain could be 'bought' with a given budget. Benefit targeting could be achieved in point-based systems by varying the point values by region or farm type (see above). Cost-based differentiation may be more difficult as cost estimates would be required for different regions and/or farm types. Furthermore, different payment rates for different farms may give rise to equity concerns as the principle of equal pay for equal work may be seen as violated.

### Certified system-based approaches or targeted measures

Defined, multi-outcome, system-based approaches can represent a step up from bundling of individual measures in a menu-based approach, or from bonuses to encourage synergies between combinations of measures. The most prominent example of this approach is organic farming, which is legally defined at EU-level, including comprehensive control and certification systems at most levels of the food value chain. Organic farming has been an agri-environmental measure applied EU-wide since 1994. In some cases, organic farming is included in the model as a uniform package of environmental measures for qualifying for payments (e.g. Gold Level in the Netherlands eco-scheme (Jongeneel *et al.*, this issue) or typically achieving Level 1 in the Rewarding Environmental Outcomes model (Lampkin and Sanders, this issue). Alternatively, selected actions defining organic farming, such as excluding mineral fertiliser and chemical plant protection, are included and organic farmers can claim the respective payments (e.g. Public Goods Payments). Other



Ripening wheat crop in a structurally rich countryside © Claudia Dodenhoff.

systems-based approaches, such as integrated or regenerative, could also be considered in this context.

**Benefits and drawbacks.** A key advantage of system-based approaches are the synergies between different system components and practices. For certified systems, the existence of inspection and certification procedures allows for simple validation from an administrative perspective. In the case of organic farming, there is also a link to premium markets that helps underpin the environmental delivery.

“ Is it justifiable to distribute a large part of the CAP budget without any significant return for the climate and environment? ”

However, there can be wide variations in environmental outcomes from certified systems due to farm type and location, as well as differing expertise and commitment on the part of individual producers. In the context of achieving specific environmental outcomes, multi-functionality can also be a disadvantage, with under-delivery of some aspects and

over-delivery of others. The Tinbergen rule for efficient policy making suggests that at least one independent measure is needed for each policy objective, which has been used to argue against the use of multi-functional system-based options. Used as foundation scheme, however, with specific measures as top-ups to address key gaps, system-based measures can be a cost-effective option (Schader *et al.*, 2014).

### Administrative challenges to be resolved

We are aware that more targeted policy approaches come with administrative challenges. Lack of predictability of farmer uptake is just one of the challenges facing the governance of incentive-based policy programmes. Over- or under-subscription may lead to a mismatch of funding requirements and available budgets. This is not the only reason that administering agencies are reluctant to buy in to innovative policy models. Additional data (beyond IACS data) may be required to assess environmental performance. Tried and tested administrative procedures may need to be changed, and stakeholders may need to be involved in designing and reviewing the policies. These issues are the focus of current and planned research, and go beyond the scope of this Special Issue.

### A good fit for the next CAP?

At first glance, the innovative policy models presented in this issue do not seem to fit in well with the Commission's plans for the CAP post 2027. The Commission's proposal favours measures with minimal added value for society, such as decoupled and coupled income support. The increased need for national co-financing and WTO Green Box compatibility makes it less attractive for national policymakers to allocate budgets to agri-environmental interventions (see Röder, in this issue). At second glance, and with a benevolent view, one can see some merit in the proposal. The agri-environmental and climate actions (AECA) are more flexible than each of its two predecessors, the eco-schemes and agri-environmental and climate schemes. The AEC actions can be anything from annual to multi-annual, linked to any sensible unit (area, heads, m<sup>3</sup>, etc.), and payments can be made for actions, environmental outcomes or proxies thereof, or both, thus allowing some of the innovative policy measures presented in this Special Issue to be implemented. At the same time, the continued payment of organic farming maintenance support as an AEC action is mandatory for Member States, reflecting its environmental prioritisation. However, this means that the implicit integration of organic farming on a similar basis to other

farms in, for example, the Public Goods Bonus, Rewarding Environmental Outcomes and Performance-based Farm Payment approaches, may be difficult. Member States will have more flexibility with respect to other certified systems, so that at least pilot testing of these options would be feasible.

### **No appetite for fundamental change**

The three policy models that represent a fundamental change in the CAP (Public Goods Bonus, Performance-based Farm Payment and Rewarding Environmental Outcomes) seem to have no place in the new CAP. These models were designed to replace all area-related payments of the current CAP and are built on the proposition that the financial resources be released. By contrast, the Commission's proposal retains a significant area-based income support payment and remains a far cry from the 'pure' model of payments for providing public goods. The paper by Gilgen and Mann (in this Special Issue) clearly shows that the same conservative attitude towards agricultural policy reform can also be observed in Switzerland. At best, the above models for a fundamental change in the CAP could be implemented in a slimmed-down form as AECA.

### **Planning for a reduced budget.**

The authors are convinced that the Commission's proposal for the CAP after 2027 is not sustainable in the long term. In times of geopolitical tensions, global upheaval, climate and biodiversity crises, it no longer seems justifiable to distribute a large part of the CAP budget indiscriminately, i.e. without any targeting of those actually proven to be in need, and without any significant return for the climate and environment. The logical political consequence will be that the ring-fencing of the CAP budget will be called into question in the negotiations of the Multiannual Financial Framework after 2034. This would put the CAP budget in direct competition with the demands from other departments that can better justify the expenditure of the scarce funds. However, the environmental problems will not disappear on their own, and solving them will require more rather than less funding. It is therefore to be hoped that the Commission will revise its proposals in the interests of a CAP that is more oriented towards the common good.

### **Flexibility is the key**

Upon reflection, we find that the contributions to this Special Issue

contain a wealth of interesting and innovative ideas. The collection of models for aligning the CAP more closely with public welfare objectives demonstrates the importance of thinking outside the box and also learning from our neighbours. However, the potential for scaling up the models is often limited. The effectiveness of the models in practice will depend on their adaptation to regional conditions and farmer characteristics (as illustrated in the articles on results-based approaches by Prager *et al.* and Gilger and Mann in this Special Issue). We thus believe that striving for a single 'EU model' is unlikely to be successful. Rather, the CAP should offer Member States sufficient flexibility for implementing different models. Equally importantly, it should provide them with clear incentives to choose implementation models that are more strongly geared towards public welfare objectives, such as those presented in this issue. The authors are convinced that this will be crucial to maintain social and political acceptance for a well-funded CAP in the long term.

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## **Further Reading**

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# Summary


## Assessing Alternative Options for a More Sustainability-focused CAP

 This paper attempts to bring together the threads from the various articles in the Special Issue and draw overarching conclusions. It does so by classifying the policy models according to specific design criteria in order to highlight similarities, differences and special features. It then discusses the merits and challenges of the design features in the presented models. Results-based schemes harness farmers' self-interest and increase 'buy-in' but involve the risk for farmers of low payments. Hybrid schemes, combining action- and results-based payments, can be a suitable remedy, as are payments based on modelled (rather than measured) results. Point systems, besides having a motivational effect on farmers, facilitate the targeting of policies to regional circumstances and are particularly well suited for communicating the societal benefits achieved. Thresholds that must be achieved to trigger payment can nudge farmers to improve their environmental performance, but are not entirely incentive-compatible. A bonus for diversity of measures at farm level can encourage innovation and engagement, but can also make the uptake of measures less predictable. These ideas can all contribute to an enhanced focus on rewarding farmers for the actual delivery of environmental outcomes, consistent with the public money for public goods ethos. However, the policy models for a fundamental re-orientation of the CAP presented appear to only have limited compatibility with the EU Commission's proposal for the next CAP reform.

## Évaluation d'options alternatives pour une Politique Agricole commune plus axée sur la durabilité

 Cet article s'efforce de synthétiser la trame des différents articles de ce numéro spécial et d'en tirer des conclusions générales. Pour ce faire, il classe les modèles de politiques publiques selon des critères de conception spécifiques afin de mettre en évidence leurs similitudes, leurs différences et leurs particularités. Il examine ensuite les avantages et les limites des caractéristiques de conception des modèles présentés. Les systèmes de rémunération au résultat tirent parti de l'intérêt personnel des agriculteurs et renforcent leur adhésion, mais les exposent au risque de faibles paiements. Les systèmes hybrides, combinant rémunération à l'action et rémunération au résultat, peuvent constituer une solution adaptée, tout comme les paiements fondés sur des résultats modélisés (plutôt que mesurés). Les systèmes de points, outre leur effet motivant sur les agriculteurs, facilitent l'adaptation des politiques aux réalités régionales et sont particulièrement efficaces pour communiquer les bénéfices sociétaux obtenus. Les seuils à atteindre pour déclencher le paiement peuvent inciter les agriculteurs à améliorer leurs performances environnementales, mais ne sont pas entièrement compatibles avec les incitations. Une prime pour la diversité des mesures mises en œuvre au niveau de l'exploitation peut encourager l'innovation et l'engagement, mais peut aussi rendre l'adoption des mesures moins prévisible. Toutes ces idées peuvent contribuer à une meilleure appréciation des résultats environnementaux obtenus par les agriculteurs, conformément au principe « des fonds publics pour des biens publics ». Cependant, les modèles de politiques présentés pour une réorientation fondamentale de la Politique agricole commune (PAC) semblent n'être que partiellement compatibles avec la proposition de la Commission européenne pour la prochaine réforme de la PAC.

## Bewertung alternativer Optionen für eine stärker auf Nachhaltigkeit ausgerichtete GAP

 Dieser Beitrag führt die Fäden aus den verschiedenen Artikeln dieser Sonderausgabe zusammen und leitet übergreifende Schlussfolgerungen ab. Dazu werden die Politikmodelle nach bestimmten Gestaltungskriterien klassifiziert, um Gemeinsamkeiten, Unterschiede und Besonderheiten herauszuarbeiten. Anschließend werden die Vorzüge und Herausforderungen der Gestaltungsmerkmale der vorgestellten Modelle erörtert. Ergebnisorientierte Modelle sprechen das Eigeninteresse der Landwirte an und erhöhen die Akzeptanz, bergen jedoch das Risiko, dass die Landwirte nur geringe Zahlungen erhalten. Hybride Modelle, die handlungs- und ergebnisbasierte Zahlungen miteinander kombinieren, können ebenso wie Zahlungen auf der Grundlage modellierter (anstatt gemessener) Ergebnisse dieses Risiko reduzieren. Punktbasierte Politikmodelle wirken motivierend auf die Landwirte und erleichtern die Ausrichtung der Politik auf regionale Gegebenheiten. Sie eignen sich darüber hinaus besonders gut, um den gesellschaftlichen Nutzen der Maßnahmen zu kommunizieren. Schwellenwerte, die erreicht werden müssen, um Zahlungen auszulösen, können Landwirte dazu anregen, ihre Umweltleistung zu verbessern, sind jedoch nicht vollkommen anreizkompatibel. Ein Bonus für Maßnahmenvielfalt auf Betriebsebene kann Innovation und Engagement fördern, aber auch die Umsetzung der Maßnahmen aus Sicht der Verwaltung weniger vorhersehbar machen. All diese Ideen können dazu beitragen, den Fokus stärker auf die Bezahlung von Landwirten für die tatsächliche Erzielung von Umweltleistungen zu legen, im Einklang mit dem Grundsatz „öffentliche Gelder für öffentliche Güter“. Die vorgestellten Politikmodelle für eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung der GAP scheinen jedoch nur begrenzt mit den Plänen der EU-Kommission vereinbar zu sein.

summary